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ABSTRACT:  The growth in the number of tourist arrivals in Spain in recent years has had 
significant economic repercussions; yet, little has been reported about its negative impact. This study 
goes some way to rectifying this by estimating the impact of tourist activity on crime rates in the 
Spanish provinces during the period 2000-2008. We use both 2-SLS and GMM techniques in a panel 
data framework to overcome the various challenges posed by estimating this relationship, namely, 
controlling for the unobserved characteristics of the provinces, and accounting for both the possible 
endogeneity of the tourist variable and the inertia of criminal activities. The results show that tourist 
arrivals have a positive and significant impact on crimes against both property and the person. 
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1. Introduction 
Crime is a major concern in many countries affecting directly (and indirectly) 
the decisions of economic and social agents and, hence, the efficiency and 
development of the overall economy. In Spain, in 2008, the Center of Sociological 
Research (CIS) reported that citizen insecurity was one of the three main concerns 
for almost one in every five Spaniards.3 To tackle these concerns, the Spanish 
government allocates an average of 2.1% of public expenditure to law 
enforcement.4 Yet, the recent evolution in criminal activity (including both crimes 
against property and against the person) in Spain presents an upward trend. 
However, while this trend is steeper for crimes against the person, the total number 
of property crimes is ten times higher. 
   Figure 1: Property crime and crime against the person 
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Source: Based on INE data. Note: The provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona, 
Girona, Lleida, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra, Vizcaya and Ceuta and Melilla are 
excluded. 
 
Spain’s tourist activity (albeit characterized by a markedly heterogeneous 
distribution across regions) is of great importance to the Spanish economy. In 
2008, 11.5% of its total gross domestic product (GDP) and 10% of its total 
employment were provided by the tourist sector.5 The importance of tourism both 
                                                            
3 Note citizen insecurity does not include concerns about terrorism. 
4 The main law enforcement agencies in Spain are the Guardia Civil with 82,812 police officers and 
the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía with 66,038 officers in the year 2009. This does not include local 
police agencies, the regional police agencies of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarra, and 
the Servicios de Vigilancia Aduanera, which are therefore excluded from this analysis.  
5 These estimates reflect the (direct) share of the tourist sector in GDP and employment and, as 
such, the indirect benefits of tourism are not taken into account. 
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in terms of production and employment is based on the arrival of 59 million tourists 
in 2008, making Spain one of the main European destinations, second only to 
France. 
Given the growing importance of tourism, especially over the last ten years, 
it has become essential to account not only for the benefits of these visitors but 
also for their costs. One of the potentially negative impacts that has not to date 
been examined empirically for the Spanish case is the effect that tourists might 
have on criminal activity. Indeed, an initial examination of the evolution of the two  
variables (i.e., tourism and crime rates) shows that both have experienced an 
upward trend in the last ten years (see Figure 2). Given the relevance of both 
variables for the Spanish case, the aim of this study is to disentangle the potentially 
causal relationship between tourism and crime rates and, more specifically, to 
determine whether or not tourist arrivals are responsible for negative externalities 
in terms of increased criminal activity. Thus, we empirically estimate the effect of 
tourist arrivals on crime rates (distinguishing between minor and serious crimes 
against both property and the person) for Spanish provinces in the period 2000-
2008 taking into account potential endogeneity problems. Indeed, there is a large 
body of empirical evidence pointing to the fact that criminal activity acts as a 
deterrent to tourism, which gives rise to a reverse causality problem when 
estimating the effect tourism has on crime. In order to obtain unbiased and 
consistent estimates, we correct this potential endogeneity problem by applying a 
recently developed instrument in the literature of the economics of crime. 
Additionally, we construct a seasonality index of tourist arrivals, as a proxy for 
tourism quality, so as to capture its effect on crime rates. 
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      Figure 2: Total number of crimes and tourists arrivals evolution 
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Source: Based on INE data. Note: The provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona, 
Girona, Lleida, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra, Vizcaya and Ceuta and Melilla are 
excluded. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents an 
empirical literature review of the relationship between tourism and crime. Section 3 
presents the empirical strategy as well as the data and variables used, while 
section 4 presents the main results obtained. Finally, section 5 presents a 
concluding section and discusses the policy implications derived from our results. 
 
2. Literature review: tourism and crime, a dual relation 
Since Becker’s (1968) seminal model, which established that the committing 
of a crime is a rational decision based on a maximization problem given a certain 
level of benefits from legal and illegal activities, and given a certain probability of 
being apprehended, various attempts have been made to examine the 
determinants of criminal activities in a variety of countries, over a range of time 
spans and adopting different techniques. These include, for example, the studies of 
Ehrlisch (1973) and Grogger (1998) for the United States; Entorf and Spengler 
(2000) for Germany; Buonanno (2006) for Italy and Buonanno and Montolio (2008) 
for Spain. The literature on the economics of crime is broad (and expanding) and 
concerns itself with many aspects, including the relationship between personality 
and drug consumption (Fajnzylber et al. 2002), age profile and crime (Usher, 
1997), as well as the impacts of urbanization levels (Glaeser et al. 1999) and 
unemployment rates (Freeman, 1991) on crime.  
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The relationship between crime and tourism has also been studied over the 
last forty years, the body of literature taking three main approaches: 
 
2.1. The impact of tourism on criminal activity 
This approach analyses tourist destinations to determine whether, in 
aggregate terms, a relationship exists between tourism and crime. The principal 
argument is that tourism may stimulate economic activity in the recipient region, 
which, as Gould (2002) points out, could result in more job opportunities for 
residents (and, hence, lower crime rates) or higher salaries and higher returns on 
illegal activities (and, hence, higher crime rates). The overall effect remains, 
therefore, an empirical question. Representative studies of this approach include 
McPheters et al. (1974) for the case of Miami, Jud (1975) for that of Mexico and 
Albanese (1985) for Atlanta. These studies find a positive and significant effect of 
tourist arrivals on property crimes; however, they report a low level of significance 
of the effect of tourism on crimes against the person.6 
This line of the literature typically assumes causality operating in the 
direction from tourism to crime; in other words, the exogeneity of the tourist 
variable with respect to crime rates is commonly assumed. However, crime also 
acts as a deterrent to tourism. As Gunn (1973) points out, crime rates are 
important when tourists make decisions about their destinations and a number of 
studies report a significant deterrent (see Levantis et al. (2000) and Alleyne and 
Boxill (2003)) to the effect that high crime rates lead tourists to choose alternative 
destinations. Thus, there is evidence of the existence of a reverse causality, which 
if not tackled properly can result in inconsistent estimates. 
Only a number of very recent studies have properly addressed this issue of 
causality, (Grinols et al., 2011; Biagi and Detotto, 2012; and Biagi et al., 2012), and 
it is one we seek to examine more fully here.  
                                                            
6 The reasons forwarded for this outcome include the change in the economic structure from that of 
an agricultural- to a tourism-based economy (see Fujii and Mak, 1979 or Fukunaga, 1975), and the 
possible specialization in a type of tourism associated with prostitution and drugs (see Urbanowicz, 
1977 and O’Donnell et al., 1980) or with gambling (see Ochrym, 1990; Giacopassi, 2000; 
Moufakkiv, 2005; Grinols et al., 2006 and Walker, 2008). 
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Grinols et al. (2011) using a simultaneous equation model to control for the 
reverse causality between crime and tourism, different specifications of tourist 
activity and a large panel data set on national park visitors in the United States, 
show that tourism has no effect on crime. However, their results are not in line with 
previous studies and are likely to be conditioned by the kind of tourism they 
analyze. Biagi and Detotto (2012) analyze the effect of tourism on crime in 2005 for 
the Italian provinces taking into account spatial correlations using a spatial lag 
model and a spatial error model. Their results show a positive and significant effect 
of tourism on crime. Biagi et al. (2012), applying a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation, find on average a positive effect: a one-percent increase in the 
number of tourists in an Italian province leads to a 0.018% rise in the crime rate per 
100,000 inhabitants. 
 
2.2. Tourists as victims 
The second approach adopted in analyses of the relationship between 
tourism and crime sees tourists as the victims of crime. Thus, the studies reviewed 
up to this point do not explicitly account for who the victims or the offenders are; 
rather, they concern themselves with whether living in a tourist area is synonymous 
with a higher risk of being victimized. Here, therefore, we review those 
contributions that aim to identify the victims of crime and, as such, examine the 
propensity of tourists to suffer criminal acts. 
Ryan (1993) analyzes why tourists may make more obvious targets for 
criminals. Among the main explanations offered is the fact that tourists are less 
likely to report a crime, which reduces the probability of the offender being 
apprehended. In addition, the fact that tourists tend to spend more time outdoors 
(Maxfield, 1987) and are more likely to carry valuable items (including cash) mean 
offenders can expect higher benefits from committing crimes against tourists. Brunt 
et al. (2000) report that English tourists suffer more robberies when on holiday than 
they do at home. However, while this conclusion is based on a descriptive analysis 
lacking any econometric analysis, this line of literature also identifies a positive 
impact of tourism on crime rates. 
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 2.3. Tourists as criminals 
 Alternatively, tourists may be cast as criminals rather than as victims, 
especially in sociological terms, but not, to the best of our knowledge, in economic 
terms.7 Sharpley (1994) reports that some tourists are quite likely to behave 
differently when on holiday since the change in their routine may lead to a degree 
of irresponsible behavior. Higher crime rates are typically associated with the 
consumption of alcohol and drugs; hence, the presence of these “leisure” activities 
in certain tourist destinations may determine, at least in part, that some tourists 
engage in criminal activity. 
In short, the preceding review of the literature examining the relation 
between tourism and crime reveals, in our view, certain weaknesses in the   
empirical strategies adopted. First, some studies base their results on (simple) 
comparisons of descriptive statistics between tourist and non tourist destinations 
(see, for instance, Jud, 1975; Ochrym, 1990; and Giacopassi, 2000); however, they 
take no steps to avoid the problem of omitted variables or to address causation 
issues adequately.  
Second, other studies, including Fujii and Mak (1979), Jud (1975) and 
Pizam (1982) use cross-sectional or time series data. Despite certain advantages, 
the use of such data sets means that the intrinsic characteristics of each 
observation cannot always be captured and so estimations might be biased as they 
overlook important unobserved characteristics. Moreover, assuming exogeneity of 
the tourist variable with respect to crime rates, as the vast majority of studies do, is 
a major assumption. 
In order to avoid these shortcomings, below we estimate a crime equation, 
as widely adopted in the economics of crime literature, using panel data techniques 
to overcome the omitted variable problem. At the same time, so as to overcome 
the endogeneity problem of the tourism variable, we estimate the equation using 
two-stage least squares (2-SLS) with the predicted number of tourists in each 
                                                            
7 Ryan (1993) claims that problems of data availability may account for this absence of economic 
studies. 
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province and year as an instrument. Moreover, we use a GMM approach as a 
robustness check and to capture the possible existence of inertia of the criminal 
activity. 
 
3. Data and empirical approach 
 
3.1 Data and variables 
In this study we use crime data8 supplied by the Spanish Home Office 
(Ministerio del Interior, MIR) in its annual report, Balance MIR (2009). This supplies 
a summary of all crimes reported by the main Spanish police agencies9, by 
province between 2000 and 2008, classified by type and severity.10 
Given the availability of panel data at the province level, we are able to carry 
out estimations that take into account unobservable characteristics of each 
province (for instance, the number of police officers or the extent to which a 
criminal act is “socially accepted”).11 The following equation presents the simplest 
empirical approach: 
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where i denotes the province, t the year and k the type of crime: αi is the fixed 
effect for each province that captures all their unobserved characteristics, while αt 
represents the fixed time effect that captures all changes common to all provinces 
but which change over time. εit is the idiosyncratic error term. 
                                                            
8 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used. 
9 According to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), the crimes reported by the 
“Cuerpo Nacional de Policia” and “Guardia Civil” account for 77% of the total. 
10 The Spanish police agencies are organized by province. However, because of decentralization, 
over the last thirty years the Basque Country, Navarra and Catalonia have set up their own police 
agencies (Ertzaina in the case of the first two regions and Mossos d’Esquadra in the third) which 
operate separate crime registers. Therefore, we exclude from our analysis the Basque provinces of 
Álava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya; the Catalan provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Tarragona and Lleida; and 
Navarra. 
11 Sah (1991) claims that individuals who grow up in environments with high crime rates are more 
likely to commit crimes since the social punishment (or peer pressure) imposed by the (local) 
community is lower. 
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 Dependent variable 
it
kCrime   represents the logarithm of the reported crime rate (expressed as 
the ratio between the reported crime and 1,000 inhabitants) of type k in province i 
in year t. The Spanish Home Office provides data on the type of crime (against the 
person or against property) and on the severity of the crime (faults and serious 
crimes). Faults are defined as crimes that receive non-custodial sentences 
whereas serious crimes are usually punished with prison terms. Clearly the 
motives for each crime type differ, and as Cherry et al. (2002) point out: "(…) it is 
inappropriate to pool crime types into a single decision model (…) much of the 
existing empirical evidence suffers from aggregation bias". Given that we can 
distinguish between property crimes and crimes against the person, we can 
eliminate such bias from our estimations.  
 
Tourist variables 
Our main variables of interest are included in the vector “touristsit” in Eq. (1). 
We first include the logarithm of the total number of tourists (labeled “tourists”). As 
explained in section 2, the arrival of tourists is expected to boost crime rates 
although certain characteristics of tourist demand, such as seasonality, need to be 
taken into account. Thus, we include the variable “season” to capture a certain 
type of tourist presenting a marked seasonal pattern (sun and sand tourists, mass 
tourists, etc.) which could be indicative of agglomeration and low quality. In fact, as 
Capó et al. (2006) point out, hotel quality has a positive influence on the length of 
the season and, as such, it affects negatively the level of seasonality. In order to 
measure the seasonality of tourist demand for each province and year, we use an 
entropy index (see Theil, 1967).12 
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12 As a robustness check, a Gini index has also been computed and used providing similar 
outcomes to those presented in the results section. 
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where ηi represents the tourist arrivals in province i and yk represents the tourist 
arrivals in each province in each month. Thus, we obtain an index of seasonality 
for each province and year. β represents the parameter that defines that part of the 
distribution to which we want to give most weight in terms of tourist arrivals. The 
larger β is, the more weight we give to changes in the upper part of the distribution 
(that is, months with high numbers of tourist arrivals). In our analysis we use β = -1 
giving more weight to changes in the lower part of the distribution13 (months with 
low numbers of tourist arrivals). The seasonality indices present values that range 
from 0.002 in 2001 in the province of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Canary 
Islands), indicating low seasonality, to 0.82 for the case of the Balearic Islands in 
2009, indicating high seasonality. In principle, we associate high seasonality with 
“low quality” and, hence, with higher crime rates; however, given the markedly 
provincial distribution of this index we do not expect a specific sign for this variable 
given that higher seasonality might also be associated with more job opportunities 
and, hence, more legitimate (job) opportunities in those provinces.14 Whatever the 
case, the need is clear when conducting the estimations of the impact of tourism 
on crime to control for the seasonality of tourism. 
 
Socio-economic variables 
In Eq. (1) all the potential socio-economic determinants of crime are 
included in the vector socio_econit. These variables are drawn from a variety of 
sources including the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE), the Valencian 
Institute of Economic Research (IVIE) and the Annual Report of La Caixa (see 
Table 1 for the descriptive statistics of the variables used).  
The unemployment rate may, as discussed by Freeman (1991), affect crime 
rates both positively or negatively. In line with the Becker-Ehrlich model, 
unemployment means a lower opportunity cost of committing crime since the 
income derived from legitimate activities is lower as unemployment benefits always 
                                                            
13 Using other values of β does not change the results significantly. 
14 Note that the two provinces that lie at the extremes of the seasonality index, Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria and Balearic Island, are two of Spain’s leading tourist resorts with similar patterns of 
tourism demand and supply. 
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forms a part of the salary. However, Freeman (1991) finds that the majority of 
offenders are employed when they commit a crime while, additionally, Witt et al. 
(1999) find that men are more prone to commit crimes. Consequently, we include 
the variable “male_unemploy” defined as the male unemployment rate in order to 
account for the effect of unemployment on crime.  
We also include the youth rate (“youth”) to reflect the effect of individuals 
aged between 15 and 30 on crime rates. As Freeman (1991,), Grogger (, 1995, 
1998) and Levitt and Lochner (2001) point out, youths are more prone o commit 
crimes since their opportunity cost is much lower. 
Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) show that crime rates may be higher in urban 
areas since the probability of being arrested is lower and the benefits of committing 
a crime are greater with cities bringing individuals of low and high incomes into 
much closer contact. Moreover, there exist economies of scale in criminal acts 
since stolen goods are more easily sold on the black market and in large urban 
areas there is a lower probability of being recognized by victims. In order to capture 
this effect we add the variable “urbanization” to account for the percentage of 
inhabitants living in urban areas with more than 20,000 people. 
The gross domestic product (GDP) is an approximation of the benefits that 
criminals may expect to obtain in both the legal and the black markets. If GDP 
captures the potential benefits of committing a crime, we would expect a positive 
sign in the crime regression. However, Fleisher (1966) states that GDP may also 
be an indicator of people’s purchasing power. Consequently, a negative sign would 
also be expected. In this study we use an inequality measure (“relative_gdp”) 
which captures the degree of inequality in the distribution of income across 
provinces. Values of the variable higher than 1 indicate that the province is richer 
than the provincial mean. 
Closely related to income dynamics is the variable “gdp_growth” which 
accounts for the growth in GDP in each province. A higher GDP growth rate 
implies a more dynamic labor market as well as more potential benefits from 
legitimate opportunities. Therefore, it should, a priori, have a negative impact on 
crime rates. 
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Usher (1997) claims that education has a “civilizing effect”. Consequently, 
we expect a negative sign for the variable “education” both for crimes against 
property and against the person. The variable is defined as the ratio between the 
number of people with 15 or more years of education and the total population in 
each province and year. 
The labor market opportunities normally encountered by the immigrant 
population, many of whom do not hold the necessary work permits, might also be a 
determinant of their propensity to commit crime. Thus, illegal immigrants may be 
more prone to commit crimes as they have fewer opportunities of obtaining rents 
from legal sources. Given that illegal immigration data are not available for the 
Spanish provinces, this effect cannot be directly included in our estimates. 
However, the variable “immigrants”, defined as the ratio between the number of 
immigrants in each province and the total population, seeks to capture the effect. 
 
Deterrence variables 
We include the rate of detentions defined as the total number of detentions 
divided by the total number of offences and distinguishing by type of crime 
(“detention_person” and “detention_proper”). We also include the clearance rate 
defined as the ratio of cleared crimes with respect to total crimes for both crimes 
against persons (“clearance_person”) and property crimes (“clearance_proper”). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
minor crimes person (Minor crimes person/pop)*1,000 378 2.006 0.588 0.867 4.388 
minor property crimes (Minor property crimes/pop)*1,000 378 9.580 5.415 1.317 26.949 
serious crimes person (Serious crimes person/pop)*1,000 378 1.897 0.853 0.536 4.935 
serious property crimes (Serious property crimes/pop)*1,000 378 13.892 8.353 1.575 49.388 
tourists # tourist arrivals 378 1,315,207 1,613,479 160,071 9,307,724 
season Theil entropy index 378 0.058 0.099 0.002 0.752 
male_unemploy (unemployed/pop)*100 378 7.695 3.701 1.525 21.153 
youth (young/pop)*100 378 10.659 1.162 8.040 13.579 
urbanization people>20,000/pop 378 52.714 18.543 22.223 92.012 
relative_gdp GDP province/ Spanish mean GDP 378 0.880 0.153 0.630 1.360 
immigrants (# foreigners/pop)*100 378 5.283 4.648 0.316 23.599 
gdp_growth % GDP per capita growth 378 5.918 2.659 -2.000 15.000 
detention_person detention person/crimes person 378 0.315 0.136 0.094 0.921 
detention_property detention property/property crimes 378 0.192 0.072 0.068 0.467 
clearance_proper clearance property/property crimes  378 0.898 0.042 0.489 0.975 
clearance_person clearance person/crimes person 378 0.183 0.048 0.050 0.338 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares 
Estimating Eq. (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) could lead to biased 
estimations if our main variable of interest, “tourists”, is endogenously determined 
by crime rates. This reverse causality may bias the estimations in our model given 
that 0),( ≠ititCrimeCorr ε   In order to overcome this endogeneity problem, we 
estimate Eq. (1) using two-stage least squares (2-SLS), and using as our 
instrument the predicted number of tourists obtained from the following index:15 
∑=
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1998
1998
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tourists
tourists
  is the proportion of tourists of nationality c in province i in the 
base year 1998. Thus, this ratio captures the importance of certain tourists (by 
nationality) in a province in the base year. The variable touristsct in Eq. (3) 
                                                            
15 This is a version of the well-known Card index employed in the literature on immigration (Card, 
2001). 
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represents the total number of tourists in Spain from country c in year t. This 
instrument indicates that an increase in, for instance, German tourists in Spain 
leads to an increase in the number of these tourists in each province proportional 
to the number of tourists existing in the base year in that same province. This 
phenomenon is attributable to “word of mouth marketing" between residents from 
the same foreign country which is translated into a "call effect". The intuition behind 
this instrument is that the distribution of tourists across provinces in 1998 does not 
explain crime rates in 2000 and, therefore, the correlation between these two 
variables is low.16 However, the number of tourist arrivals in 1998 does explain the 
number of tourist arrivals in 2000 and, consequently, it proves to be a suitable 
instrument. Having obtained the values of itZ , we can carry out the following first-
stage regression: 
∑ ++++=
l
itlitittiit econsocioZtourists εβλλ )_(    (4) 
where λi and λt represent the fixed effects of each province and year, respectively, 
and socio_econit represents the vector of socio-economic variables presented 
above. From Eq. (4) we obtain the predicted values of the arrival of tourists, 
" itTourists ”, which are used as the instrument in the second-stage.  
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  (5) 
β measures the impact of a one-percent increase in the number of tourists whereas 
ψ measures the impact of the seasonality of tourist demand. 
 
GMM approach 
In the literature of the economics of crime the inertia patterns presented by 
criminal activity, that is, the persistence of criminal activity over time, are well 
documented. This phenomenon can be attributed to several causes (Fajnzylber et 
al., 2002, and Buonanno and Montolio, 2008). Thus, for instance, criminals seem 
to acquire new techniques as they commit more crimes and while committing these 
crimes they appear to learn from their previous mistakes. This implies that the 
                                                            
16 The correlation is lower than 0.4. 
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costs of any criminal act are reduced over time (Case and Katz, 1991). Moreover, 
criminals who have served custodial sentences tend to have fewer opportunities of 
finding employment in the legal market (Grogger, 1995). As such, they are obliged 
once more to obtain rents from the illegal market. In empirical terms, including the 
lag dependent variable captures this criminal recidivism. 
( ) ( )
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        (6) 
Estimating Eq. (6), which contains the lag dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable, by means of ordinary methods would give inconsistent 
estimations as Crimekit-1 and αi are correlated even if the idiosyncratic error term is 
not serially correlated. Removing the province fixed effect by taking first differences 
does not deal with the problem either since the lagged endogenous variable is 
correlated with the differences in the error term. That is, Crimekit-1 is correlated with 
εit-1. An alternative would be to obtain the "within" transformations; however, these 
transformations are only consistent under the strong assumption of exogeneity of 
the regressors. Given that in our model, at least the “tourists” variable might not 
be exogenous, the "within" transformation is not a solution. To solve this problem, 
we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (see Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). This estimator requires, first, taking first-
differences in order to remove the fixed effects. 
11211 )()( −−−−− −+−+−=− itititititititit XXCrimeCrimeCrimeCrime εεβλ  (7) 
Eq. (7) presents the need for instrumentation as there is a clear correlation 
between the variables in the vector X (all the regressions previously presented) 
and the error term, as well as between the difference of the variable Crime and the 
error term. Similarly, applying the GMM requires the assumption of, at least, weak 
exogeneity of the variables. This implies that the variables in X are influenced by 
their past values but not by their future values. Moreover, we assume that the 
following moments hold: 
[ ]0)]( 1,,, =−× −− titistiCrimeE εε  for 3≥s    (8) 
[ ]0)]( 1,,, =−× −− titistiXE εε  for 2≥s    (9) 
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The use of the lagged variables as instrument is typically referred to as the 
difference GMM estimator. Although the estimations are consistent, they are not 
efficient. For panel data with few observations, as is our case here, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) propose the GMM system estimator. This procedure constructs a 
system with both the equations in levels and the equations in differences. Given 
that in the level equation the fixed effects are still present, additional instruments 
have to be used to avoid the correlation with the other regressors. In this case, the 
instruments used are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. Note 
that even if the levels of the right-hand-side variable and the province-specific 
effect can be correlated, the differences of these variables and the province 
specific effect are uncorrelated. This assumption results from the following 
stationarity property: 
 ][][
][][
,,
,,
iptiiqtit
iqtiiptit
CrimeECrimeE
CrimeECrimeE
ηη
ηη
×=×
×=×
++
++
   (10) 
We also need to consider the additional moment conditions for the regression in 
levels that are given by: 
[ ]0)]()( ,1,, =+×− −−− itististi CrimeCrimeE ηε  for  s=2  (11) 
[ ]0)]()( ,1,, =+×− −−− itististi XXE ηε  for s=1  (12) 
To verify the validity of the instruments we use the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions. We also need to check for the absence of serially correlated error 
terms, which is a required condition for the consistency of the GMM estimator. We 
perform tests for first (AR(1)) and second order (AR(2)) serial correlations under 
the null hypothesis of the presence of serial correlation. If there is no serial 
correlation in the error term, the first-differenced residuals should reject the null 
hypothesis in the AR(1) test but not that in the AR(2) test (see Arellano and Bond, 
1991). 
 
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the first-stage and second-stage 
estimations for all crime types. First-stage results are presented in Table 2. Column 
1 presents the estimation of the instrument obtained with the index (see Eq. 3) for 
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the total number of tourist arrivals without taking into account any fixed effects. 
Column 2 accounts for the socio-economic variables while columns 3 and 4 add 
province and year fixed effects, respectively. We chose the fourth column as our 
estimation with which to construct our instrument,17 the validity of which can also 
be evaluated in Figure 3. This instrument is optimal since it is highly correlated with 
the dependent variable, given that the number of tourists in each province in 1998 
accounts for the number of tourists in the following years, and the correlation 
between our instrument and the crime rates for all crime types is always lower than 
40%, indicating that the number of tourists in 1998 does not account for the crime 
rates in the following years. 
 
Table 2: First-stage results  
     
 tourists 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Zit 1.02273*** 0.97913*** 1.01519*** 0.99387*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.059) (0.061) 
     
Observations 420 378 378 378 
R-squared 0.966 0.977 0.747 0.757 
Province FE NO NO YES YES 
year FE NO NO NO YES 
Control Variables NO YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
    Figure 3: Real number of tourists and predicted number of tourists 
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17 The choice of the instrument also depends on the second stage of the estimation. As we use 
province and year fixed effects, we have to use the same control variables in the first-stage.  
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Second-stage results are presented in Table 3 for crimes against the person and in 
Table 4 for property crimes. In both tables, columns 1 to 3 report the estimations 
for serious crimes while columns 4 to 5 present the estimations for minor crimes. 
For each estimation, we report the results when using fixed effects, 2-SLS and 
GMM system estimations. In the GMM system estimations the tourist variable is 
instrumented with the predicted number of tourist arrivals obtained in the first-
stage, whereas the lagged value of the crime rate as well as the detention rate, 
clearance rate, male unemployment and GDP growth are instrumented with the 
usual instruments of the GMM system.18 
 
Crimes against the person 
The results for our variable of interest, tourism, show little or no effect when 
using fixed effects (columns 1 and 4 of Table 3) and no effect when using 2-SLS 
(columns 2 and 5 of Table 3). Nevertheless, as explained above, the fixed effect 
estimations are likely to be inconsistent as the number of tourist arrivals is affected 
simultaneously by criminal activity while the 2-SLS does not take into account the 
inertia of crime or the potential endogeneity of other variables. Therefore, we focus 
our attention on those results that we believe to be consistent and efficiently 
estimated. The GMM estimates (columns 3 and 6 of Table 3) show that the lag 
dependent variable, which captures the inertia of criminal activities at the provincial 
level, is positive and highly significant, indicating that provinces with high crime 
rates in the past are likely to experience high crime rates today, as a consequence 
perhaps of the tendency for criminals to reoffend (see Fajnzylber et al., 2000). The 
impact of the number of tourist arrivals on crime rates is positive and statistically 
significant in the case of serious crimes and positive but not significant for minor 
crimes. A one-percent increase in the number of tourists increases the rate of 
serious crimes against the person by 0.10%.  
 
 
                                                            
18 Up to four lags were used in the estimations for both the level and the difference equations. A 
larger number of lags gives similar results but weakens the Hansen test. 
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Table 3: Serious and minor crimes against the person. 
 Serious crimes Minor crimes 
 FE 2-SLS GMM-
system 
FE 2-SLS GMM-
system 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
tourists 0.12424* 0.11481 0.10818** 0.01517 0.03012 0.00704 
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.041) (0.069) (0.055) (0.034) 
season 0.80114*** 1.11519 -0.41980*** 0.36886 0.45980 -0.28428** 
 (0.301) (0.776) (0.136) (0.610) (0.908) (0.111) 
urbanization 0.00337 0.00903 -0.00158 0.00118 0.00444 0.00091 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
relative_gdp 0.37682 1.08903** 0.69189*** 0.11031 0.76190*** 0.46398*** 
 (0.322) (0.522) (0.171) (0.353) (0.284) (0.132) 
immigrants 0.00893 0.03023*** 0.00791** -0.01110** 0.01337*** 0.00606* 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
gdp_growth -0.00006 -0.00153 -0.00124 -0.00066 -0.00327** 0.00843 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
male_unemploy -0.00819* -0.01027*** 0.00036 -0.00965** -0.01920*** 0.01328*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
youth 0.08975*** 0.00033 0.08873*** 0.14163*** 0.07127*** -0.00038 
 (0.024) (0.052) (0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) 
clearance_person 0.08514 0.12002 0.64113 -0.07337 -0.31670 -0.28517 
 (0.212) (0.315) (0.383) (0.208) (0.218) (0.241) 
detention_person 0.88963*** 1.53340*** -0.50328 -0.30190 0.10310 -0.36192 
 (0.152) (0.147) (0.340) (0.197) (0.103) (0.241) 
education 0.00309 0.00357 -0.01551* -0.00804* 0.00394 -0.01676** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
crimeit-1   0.73399***   0.85629*** 
   (0.097)   (0.080) 
       
Observations 378 378 336 378 378 336 
R-squared 0.859 0.834  0.520 0.338  
Number of 
provinces 
42 42 42 42 42 42 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
hansenp . . 0.922 . . 0.784 
ar1p . . 1.40e-05 . . 2.70e-05 
ar2p . . 0.656 . . 0.304 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for the fixed effect estimation. Bootstrapped errors in 
parentheses for the 2-SLS and GMM estimations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
A possible explanation for the absence of any effect of tourist arrivals on 
minor crimes is that of underreporting. If it is the tourists themselves that are the 
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victims, typically their time is more limited when on holiday and so they do not 
report such crimes to the police, unless that is  they involve loss of documentation 
or injuries that require medical treatment. In the case of the seasonality index, this 
is found to have a negative effect on crimes against the person, indicating that the 
concentration in time of tourist arrivals reduces the number of crimes against the 
person. 
In general, the socio-economic variables present the expected sign. 
However, some specific results are worth noting given that crimes against the 
person are usually not (very well) explained by economic factors. In this sense, 
“gdp_growth” and the level of “urbanization” of a province are not statistically 
significant. By contrast, “relative_gdp” has a positive impact and 
”male_unemploy” presents a positive sign when taking its possible endogeneity 
into account (GMM estimates). Another result in line with findings in the literature 
(Freeman, 1991; Grogger, 1998 and Levitt, 2001) is the positive impact of “youth” 
on (serious) crimes against the person. The share of “immigrants” also has a 
positive impact on crimes against the person.19 The variable “education” presents 
a negative effect on crime indicating that the higher the level of education, the 
lower the probability of committing crimes. Following Lochner (2007), this result 
can be explained in terms of higher youth socialization and/or higher returns from 
legitimate work. As expected for crimes against the person, the deterrence 
variables do not seem to have a statistically significant impact on such crimes. The 
positive impact obtained for the “detention_person” in the 2-SLS may be 
capturing the fact that more crimes are now being detected due to an increase in 
the resources devoted to the prevention, detection and investigation of such crimes 
in Spain in the years under study. 
 
Property crimes 
As documented in the literature of the economics of crime, we would expect 
property crimes to be better explained by socio-economic variables than is the 
                                                            
19 This result would seem to be in line with certain police reports that indicate that immigrants are 
involved in 3 out 5 cases of domestic violence. 
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case of crimes against the person (see Table 4). With respect to our main variable 
of interest, the number of tourist arrivals has a positive and significant impact on 
property crime rates when inertia and endogeneity of the socio-economic variables 
are taken into account (columns 3 and 6).  
 
Table 4: Serious and minor property crimes 
 Serious crimes Minor crimes 
 FE 2-SLS GMM-system FE 2-SLS GMM-system 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
tourists -0.04373 
(0.105) 
0.04228 
(0.115) 
 
0.35482*** 
(0.088) 
0.03355 
(0.157) 
-0.15009 
(0.226) 
0.10170* 
(0.051) 
season -1.07535*** -1.05804** -0.30073 -0.55141 -0.62950 -0.73823 
 (0.369) (0.443) (0.474) (0.367) (0.881) (0.502) 
urbanization -0.01815** -0.01901** -0.00010 -0.00347 -0.00448 0.00183 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) 
relative_gdp -0.04375 -0.10196 0.94082** 3.10840 2.96481** 0.10427 
 (0.545) (0.676) (0.456) (1.973) (1.268) (0.326) 
immigrants 0.00145 -0.00157 0.01096 0.03018 0.03582 -0.01745*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.038) (0.038) (0.005) 
gdp_growth -0.00453 -0.00417 -0.01970** -0.02077* -0.02185** -0.01164* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) 
male_unemploy -0.00164 -0.00196 0.00869 -0.00767 -0.00759 0.00802 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
youth 0.14744** 0.16678*** 0.14735* 0.01619 -0.00319 0.03165 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.086) (0.123) (0.152) (0.037) 
clearance_proper -3.56666** -3.63911*** -3.59763*** -1.08852 -0.90515 -1.96978*** 
 (1.419) (1.179) (1.055) (0.660) (1.082) (0.511) 
detention_proper -1.19079** -1.08664*** -0.53128 -1.35957 -1.65885 -1.09641** 
 (0.508) (0.386) (0.561) (0.919) (1.052) (0.434) 
education 0.00614 0.00822 -0.00797 -0.02662  0.02000 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.021)  (0.014) 
crimeit-1   0.00383   0.59849*** 
   (0.086)   (0.121) 
Observations 378 378 336 378 378 336 
R-squared 0.551 0.437  0.350 0.346  
Number of 
provinces 
42 42 42 42 42 42 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
hansenp . . 1 . . 1 
ar1p . . 0.0565 . . 0.113 
ar2p . . 0.221 . . 0.0853 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for the fixed effect estimation. Bootstrapped errors in 
parentheses for the 2-SLS and GMM estimations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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 The impact is much greater for serious property crimes than it is for minor 
property crimes. Specifically, a one-percent increase in the number of tourists 
increases serious property crimes by 0.35% and minor property crimes by 0.10%. 
Moreover, seasonality does not seem to have a marked impact on property crime 
and if it does, the effect is negative, meaning that the higher the concentration of 
tourist arrivals in time, the smaller the number of property crimes.20 
The inertia of criminal activity seems to be present only in the case of minor 
crimes, with serious crimes tending not to show the same degree of inertia. This 
means for instance that provinces with a high degree of pickpocketing (the most 
frequently reported minor crime) tend to have higher crime rates in the following 
years. This is particularly true of provinces with large tourist cities whose crowded 
and commercial streets are favored by pickpockets. 
The proportion of people living in cities with over 20,000 inhabitants 
(“urbanization”) has a negative impact on serious property crimes when inertia is 
not taken into account. This result is somewhat controversial as the literature 
consistently points to the positive effect of urbanization on crime rates, especially 
property crimes (Gaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). The variable “relative_gdp” seems 
to present a positive impact, at least for serious crimes, suggesting that the richer 
the province compared to other provinces, the higher its property crime rate. The 
variable “immigrants” shows no impact on serious crimes and a negative and 
significant impact for minor crimes, indicating that the higher the number of 
immigrants, the higher the property crime rate. Economic activity measured by 
“gdp_growth” presents a negative sign, indicating that the higher the opportunities 
to obtain legal rents, the lower the rate of property crimes (Fleisher, 1966). 
However, “male_unemploy” and “education” are not statistically significant in the 
estimations performed. The share of young people does not affect the number of 
minor property crimes but it positively affects the serious property crime rate, 
suggesting that vandalism and large benefits attract young criminals. It is perhaps 
                                                            
20 The negative impact might be due to the fact that criminals focus their attention on provinces with 
lower seasonality (higher quality) because of the higher expected returns from illegal activities. 
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worth stressing once more that minor crimes (in general) suffer from a problem of 
underreporting. For instance, someone who has his motorbike scratched may not 
report it to the police since they may consider it a waste of time as the chances of 
the offender being caught are low. This could explain why only a few coefficients 
are statistically significant in the estimations presented.  
Finally, for the property crimes, the deterrence variables in general show the 
expected negative and significant sign. Both the clearance and detention rates 
show negative and highly significant signs. 
 
5. Conclusions 
To date, the models and techniques adopted in the literature of economics 
of crime have reported a somewhat ambiguous relationship between tourism and 
crime. The contribution of the present study has been to estimate, by means of 
panel data techniques for the Spanish provinces between 2000 and 2008, the 
impact of tourist arrivals on crime rates distinguishing by the severity of the crime 
(serious and minor crimes) and typology (crimes against the person and property 
crimes). Additionally, the endogeneity problem (by and large ignored in previous 
studies) arising from the existence of reverse causality between crime and tourism 
makes the use of empirical approaches other than OLS essential. Here, we employ 
2-SLS estimates where the instrument selected is the predicted number of tourist 
arrivals obtained from an index with a base year of 1998. The power of this 
instrument enables us to control for the endogeneity of our main variable but not 
for the potential endogeneity of the other variables. Therefore, in order to obtain 
consistent estimations we take into account the inertia of criminal activity and use a 
GMM system approach instrumenting the lagged dependent variable as well as the 
detention rate, clearance rate, male unemployment and GDP growth with the usual 
GMM instruments. 
Our results highlight an important negative externality of tourist arrivals. In 
the case of property crimes, a one-percent increase in the number of tourist 
arrivals in a given province leads to a 0.10% increase in minor crimes and a 0.35% 
increase in serious crimes. In the case of crimes against the person, tourist arrivals 
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also constitute a negative externality, but only on serious crimes. The impact of a 
one-percent increase in the number of tourist arrivals leads to a 0.10% increase in 
the number of serious crimes against the person. 
This paper has also examined the impact of tourist concentration in time 
(seasonality) on crime rates. Here, when the estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant it presents a negative sign indicative of the fact that criminal activity 
tends to concentrate in provinces with lower seasonality and, hence, with higher 
quality, that is, where the returns to illegal activities associated with tourism are 
highest. 
Given the impact of tourism on property crime rates and on crimes against 
the person, it is clear that policy makers need to take these results into account 
and allocate greater amounts of resources to law enforcement in regions recording 
high numbers of tourist arrivals. 
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